RECIPROCAL ACCEPTANCE OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION AND CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS SERVICES (UNITED STATES)

Several projects related to harmonization of aviation transport personnel and aircraft certifications have been proposed within APEC for mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). The purpose of this paper is to provide background on the concept of mutual recognition and its relevance to the aviation safety arena from the perspective of the United States.

1.0 Introduction

1.1. MRAs appear to mean different things to different people. As currently practised, an MRA’s focus is not regulatory co-operation or safety. Rather, it seeks to increase market access by reducing regulatory barriers. Aircraft certification and continued airworthiness are safety functions and should not be commingled with trade interests via an MRA. Therefore, other options to minimize perceived duplicative certifications should be explored.

1.2. Safe products will find a market and drive trade, not vice versa. It is likely that the export of aircraft, components and products together with aircraft engineering and maintenance services earns significant revenue for businesses in many APEC economies. Aerospace exports are a major revenue source for the United States economy, and U.S. manufacturers increasingly rely on access to high quality suppliers throughout the Asia-Pacific region. It is in the interest of all parties to ensure that safety remains the focus of the aviation industry.

2.0 Background

1. The concept of mutual recognition is being championed in many sectors as a means to facilitate trade. The principles laid out in the preamble of a typical MRA are the concepts of "friendship,. . enhancement of product quality,. . . market access,. . . and improved conditions of trade."
2. Some have proposed that MRAs, based on success in the automotive field, should also be applied in the aviation sector. The United States objects to the use of MRAs in the aviation environment for a number of reasons, but most importantly because global aviation safety is interdependent and relies on the application of the highest level of objective and independent oversight. In other sectors, such as automotive, the public is not at risk until a product is actually imported. With aviation, there are risks due to the very nature of the global air transportation system and the overflight rights permitted under ICAO—e.g. to the public on the ground and the different citizenry who are passengers on an aircraft—without any import of the actual product.
3. As the APEC Group of Experts on Aviation Safety and Assistance (GEASA) noted in 1997, "a significant safety deficiency in one State is a high safety risk for other States." The aviation industry is unique because of this interdependence and because it functions under the long-established norms of the International Convention on Civil Aviation. Once trade becomes a consideration in airworthiness decisionmaking, the possibility arises that unairworthy/substandard products could reach world markets in the pursuit of economic development.

2.3 In addition, most of the world’s aviation authorities have a safety regulatory mission only. Because MRAs are trade-focused, the responsibility for their implementation usually lies with economic agencies, potentially imposing additional bureaucracy and Committee frameworks onto what are now compliance functions between civil aviation authorities. The involvement of additional organizations could complicate and delay continued airworthiness actions. The MRA framework does not provide the clear lines of accountability, expertise and authority required for effective aviation safety regulation.

2.4. Within APEC, MRAs have been viewed as solutions to such diverse issues as personnel licensing, aircraft certification and continued airworthiness, and proposed in the context of committees on "more competitive transportation" and "human resources development." The GEASA report highlights that the underlying problem is not standards or certifications, "rather it is the willingness and ability of APEC member economies to develop an infrastructure that supports safe transportation." Without the underlying infrastructure commitment, no agreement will be effective.

2.5. The role of aviation safety regulators is to ensure safe transportation, recognizing that there is a price for safety. Investment in a regulatory infrastructure and competency must occur first. Once this infrastructure is established and recognized, then the issue becomes how to ensure this aviation safety function without needless duplication and cost.

3.0 The Need for Common Understanding and Reciprocal Acceptance

3.1. The United States recognizes that multiple certifications can be burdensome, and in some cases may not provide additional safety value. Sometimes economies will justify their own certificate activities by the absence of harmonized regulations, or in cases of complex products/new technology, each authority may want to be involved in certification programs to familiarize themselves with these products. But recognizing that this is not cost-efficient, the United States and Europe have been moving towards acceptance of common certifications even where regulations differ, by allowing the domestic authority to find compliance to a list of additional requirements/technical conditions on behalf of the other economy. The FAA has recognized under its Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements that surveillance of manufacturing and repair stations can be delegated to another bilateral partner economy. This delegation is made, however, only where a determination has been made that a competent civil aviation authority is able to undertake this work using comparable methods and requirements to the U.S. system.

3.2 The United States has a long history of bilateral agreements for airworthiness, dating to the 1930’s. But even under these agreements, the FAA will review the findings of another exporting authority before issuing its own certificates. Experience has shown that being human, aviation authorities can sometimes miss compliance items in the design of an aeronautical product. Examples of this are certification for: flight into icing conditions, flights under instrument flight rules, crashworthiness of aircraft interiors, and stall speed. The introduction of new technologies or design concepts also creates compliance issues that may warrant additional review.

3.3 Reciprocal acceptance is a time-proven concept, that perhaps needs streamlining. The concept of true mutual recognition without further showing, however, could prove disastrous in the aviation environment. The United States supports a continuation of reciprocal acceptance of approvals of another Economy, with a goal being to use common procedures throughout APEC. The legal framework for such a system has already been accepted and tested in the U.S. court system.

3.4 Trust is a significant factor in any agreement process. Trust based on competency and technical expertise is critical in the aviation safety arena. APEC economies should proceed cautiously in pursuing agreements that can create a perception that trade is equal to or more important than aviation safety.

This page was last updated on 15 May 2000